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Globalization has reached its end-point
The world economy is in peril. The almighty promises of neoliberal globalization have failed to materialize and instead it seems that the ideology of utopian “free-markets” has reached its end-point. Globalization has become synonymous with a dysfunctional calamity of hyper exploitation, growing inequalities, and exclusive imposition of property rights for a tiny elite of super nova rich on planet earth. Globalisation, with its technocratic and technological determinism and market idolatry, had 30 years. The signs of decline are clear, and since 1995 they have multiplied turning a confused situation into a collapse. We have scarcely noticed this collapse, however, because globalisation has been asserted by its believers to be inevitable - an all-powerful god; a holy trinity of burgeoning markets, unsleeping technology and borderless managers. Opposition or criticism has been treated as little more than romantic paganism (Saul 2004; Saul 2005).
The results of this period of freewheeling capitalism have been damaging but also predictable as states have collapsed, dictatorships re-installed with the blessings of the United States and the European Union, and the real economy is crumbling under the artificial and speculative “casino economy” (Strange 1986), labor markets have been informalized and the criminal economy growing. The monopoly of the means of organized violence of the state has been cast in jeopardy and widely disappearing. “The world is littered with collapsed states. In these parts of the world, wars are fought by irregular armies commanded by political and religious organizations, often clan-based, and prone to savage internecine conflicts” (Gray 2001). In other cases the wars are fought by private companies owned by US, British and other contractors who fight illegal wars – in many cases as substitute proxies for US and European governments. The result is a growing flow of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees trying to cross the ”great wall” of high tech borders of Europe, the US and Asia. More than 100 million international migrants are left without basic human rights, vulnerable and marginalized – they remain those who build the so-called “Asian miracle”, who comprise the bonded labor substitute for the non-redistributive economic policies of the region, and who bear the missing Asian welfare state on their shoulders. They have built the skyscrapers of the metropoles and they live and work together with the internal migrants and slum dwellers in the informalized sectors of Bangkok, Singapore, and Shanghai.
On a global scale, privatization, trade liberalization and market deregulation has not only created massive financial turmoil, but has also sparked an alarming food crisis. The World Bank, prime promoter of the “free trade and export or die” model, now tells us that there may be food riots in 33 countries. And the WTO fears a resurgence of protectionism: some food-exporting countries – India, Vietnam, Egypt, Kazakhstan – have decided to reduce exports in order to feed their own people. Prices for basic food commodities have risen dramatically (over 35% in the past year alone), and millions of people are surviving below the UN minimum calorific. Moreover, UN Special Rapporteur for the Right to Food Jean Ziegler says that the production of biofuels is "a crime against humanity" because of its impact on global food prices. He also accused the EU of subsidizing its agriculture exports with effect of undermining production in Africa. "The EU finances the exports of European agricultural surpluses to Africa ... where they are offered at one half or one third of their (production) price."  "That completely ruins African agriculture," and “creates hunger refugees”. In recent months, rising food costs have sparked violent protests in Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Haiti, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mauritania, the Philippines and other countries. In Pakistan and Thailand, troops have been deployed to avoid the seizure of food from fields and warehouses, while price increases fuelled a general strike in Burkina Faso.  Paired with the climate threat and the almost complete disruption of the global governance system by the neo-conservative fundamentalists in Washington have led to a point of no return.

The UN, IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO work primarily to the benefit of the US and the EU and have been turned into instruments of power politics, but are also increasingly sidelined for the re-mergence of  old realist double-speak, hypocrisy and double-standards in terms of democracy and human rights promotion. If the wrong side wins the election like Front Islamique du Salut in Algeria or Hamas in the Palestinian occupied territories the democratic process is cancelled. By focusing on war in Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, the purpose of which is to secure US and European oil interests, encircle Russia and China, and to guarantee Israel’s territorial expansion, the executive and legislative branches, along with the media, have let slip the last opportunities the US had to put its financial house in order (Roberts 2007). 

The function of those in power is to promote the expansion of capital accumulation – agents such as the World Bank are often criticized on the grounds that their policies do not promote development, but it should be understood that their function is to promote capital accumulation, which continues to entail a transfer of wealth from the South to the North. Their premise is that the accumulation system is immutable and must be conformed to (Biel 2000: X), but it seems that the Brettonwoords system has become outmoted and running out of customers. 

It all started in the United States and it all seems to end in the North American “free market” laboratory where the triple deep scaled depression of the economy, the environment and political institutions are failing to cope with the current situation. Even the IMF sees the continuing deep correction in the US housing market and the unresolved financial sector problems have led the economy to the verge of recession. “In fact, we are now anticipating that the United States will indeed slip into recession” (IMF 2008). The contagion effects of the crisis have reached the global level and pose tremendous challenges to people’s organizations, solidarity movements and those who fight for increasing social, political and ecological rights of ordinary people- whether at the local, national, regional or even global levels.

The deep systemic causes of the social and environmental crises unfolding around us are related to the growth of endless consumption, increasing levels of inequality, and unwise institutional pathology which to a very large degree is induced by US administrations. The neoliberal imperative is depleting the natural life support system of the planet, disrupting hydrology and climate systems, and threatening human survival (Korten 2007). As President Chavez pointed out at the United Nations, quoting Noam Chomsky, ”the US rulers show themselves willing to risk even the survival of the species in pursuit of global hegemony” (Estabrook 2007). Climate change which before was interpreted as a transnational ethical problem has become a major political issue and coupled with other global, regional and local dramas it might increasingly be identified as a security issue especially when it is linked to the systemic failure of the current mode of production – no matter what type of political and institutional layer this type of market economy is embedded in. There are horizontal links and close connections between the failures of capitalism and the depletion of oil and the tremendous price hike on this and other natural resources (Crude oil price increased five-fold in five years from $22 per barrel in 2003 to $125 in May 2008). Scarcity of water and oil are already a security issue which has created wars. Corporate interests claim that water “is the oil of this century.” Developed nations have taken cheap, abundant fresh water largely for granted. Now global population growth, pollution, and climate change are shaping a new view of water as “blue gold.” ”Global water markets, including drinking water distribution, management, waste treatment, and agriculture are a nearly $500 billion market and growing fast But governments pushing to privatize costly to maintain public water systems are colliding with a global “water is a human right” movement. Because water is essential for human life, its distribution is best left to more publicly accountable government authorities to distribute at prices the poorest can afford, those water warriors say. Global warming isn’t going to change the amount of water, but some places used to getting it won’t, and others that don’t, will get more,” says Dan Nees, a water-trading analyst with the World Resources Institute. “Water scarcity may be one of the most underappreciated global political and environmental challenges of our time.” Water woes could have an impact on global peace and stability” (Clayton 2008).
 The depletion of water and oil is closely linked to the food crisis and the speculative increase in the price of food and primary commodities which create social havoc and cause an enormous strain on poor people’s time, money and stomachs. Seeing this cacophony of crises as a systemic failure in a geo-political and geo-economic perspective makes it imperative to understand the impact of the deregulated financial cum speculative capital which has now reached the real economy. It is almost unbelievable: “40 per cent of total corporate profits in the US in recent years went to the financial sector that in itself does not 'produce' … but that 'intermediates and organises' the resources that do produce" (Dervish 2008). When the price on crude oil increases so do food and at the same time the drive to produce gasoline with bioethanol has lead to a speculative bubble in primary commodity prices which again has catastrophic consequences for the worlds poor. It is a tsunami driving more than 100 million people into hunger and starvation. 
The growing concentration of financial power in a global economy engaged in an ever more intense competition for a declining base of material wealth is eroding the social fabric to the point of widespread social breakdown. Institutional pathology denotes that “the most powerful institutions on the planet, global financial markets and the transnational corporations that serve them, are dedicated to growing consumption and inequality. They convert real capital into financial capital to increase the relative economic power of those who live by money, while depressing the wages of those who produce real value through their labor. They offer palliatives that leave the deeper cause of our potentially terminal environmental and social crises untouched, because they are the cause” (Korten 2007). 
A clear sign of the long-term economic decay of the US global competitive position between 2002-2008 is evidenced by the fact that a 40% depreciation of the dollar has failed to substantially improve the US balance of payments, let alone produce a trade surplus (Petras 2008). Furthermore, Americans have experienced a decline in real income.  Some studies find long-term declines in the real median incomes of some US population groups and a decline in upward mobility. Since 2001 the pay of the typical worker in the US has been stuck, with real wages growing less than half as fast as productivity. By contrast, the corporate CEOs have enjoyed a Beckhamesque bonanza.The total pay of the typical top American manager has increased from roughly 40 times the average-the level for four decades - to 110 times the average now (The Economist  Jan. 18th 2007). 17% of Americans are living below the poverty line. The middle class is rapidly dissolving into the under class. Home wages are falling even as worker productivity continues to rise. Workers are producing more goods and services, but their productivity is rewarded by lower pay and longer hours. Executies of TNCs and financial institutions are realizing obscene profits while workers are losing their pensions (Baker 2007).

The reasons why there is a total lack of confidence in the market are manifold and related to speculation, US outward investment and overseas relocation of production and because the ‘objects’ up for sale have become so lacking of value, i.e. so intangible and unrelated to the real economy. “Tax payers are busy bailing out the companies that insisted (​http:​/​​/​www.monbiot.com​/​archives​/​2007​/​10​/​23​/​libertarians-are-the-true-social-parasites​/​​) on less government intervention, acting as a financial safety net for the rich while their own living standards decline (​http:​/​​/​www.americanprogress.org​/​issues​/​2007​/​04​/​poverty_numbers.html​)” (Petras 2008).
The falling exchange rate of the US dollar has consequences for the new rising powers in Asia where China holds over one trillion dollars, and Japan almost one trillion, in dollar-denominated assets. Taking into account that the US dollar is the reserve currency, the entire world’s investment portfolio is over-weighted in dollars. Japan and China have accumulated dollars as the counterpart of their exports to the US market. Nobody seems to realise quite how serious the collapse of the dollar is for the global economy, nor the long-term consequences of this decline for the position of the US in the world. 
In this way, there are many enduring signs spelling the end of the neoliberal globalization era. The military industrial complex now has the upper hand in American politics while protectionism and nationalism are growing. Indeed the end of globalization started probably with the enactment of the WTO where any international exchange that involved a commercial element would be treated as fundamentally commercial. Culture would be seen as a mere matter of industrial regulation; food, as a secondary outcome of agricultural industries (Saul 2004). Now the Doha Round and the WTO itself has lost any credibility and international trade is relying on the Chinese power engine. The post 9/11 era marked a central new configuration of the Clinton period which saw the ascendancy of economic neoliberalism while the current situation is marked by politics in command i.e. that the military and political dimensions of coercive and brute force have replaced soft diplomacy. 
This crisis could in principle be resolved by a major systemic shake-up, involving (for example) new economic doctrines and new forms of international relations. But this time it is more unlikely because of two reasons: First, non-renewable natural and human resources are being exhausted and no form of capitalism can resolve that (Biel 2000: 288). Second based on historical experience the decline of US hegemony – a declining power armed to the teeth - is unlikely to give up power voluntarily. #The US maintains a network of 737 American military bases around the world (according to the Pentagon's own 2005 official inventory). Not including the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, there are over half a million US troops, spies, contractors, dependents, and others on military bases located in more than 130 countries, many of them presided over by dictatorial regimes that have given their citizens no say in the decision to let them in (Johnson 2007).  The current shift of economic gravity from the West to the East can only be solved through a major war or by the creation of a new multi-polar world order based on several regional centers of power. In Latin America, a new generation of leftist political leaders is responding to a profound disillusion with neoliberal policies. Similar currents are stirring in Africa and especially East Asia (although with a different political and ideological flavour). The common struggle against entrenchment of property rights in the WTO has forged political and economic links between major regions of the global south. Given the severe imbalance of power between the developed and the developing world, it is difficult to imagine that a multilateral financial and economic order would not be biased to favour the rich and the mighty. Regional formations would have to furnish themselves with financial institutions to complement the management of external trade and investment (Schmidt 2008). 
The main argument of this paper is that we have reached the end of globalization and will probably move into a period of renewed nationalism and protectionism. It seems that energy depletion and climate change are precipitous factors converging with global economic meltdown, exacerbating it and creating the grim post-neoliberal-collapse world. This scenario has been covered in the first section and the second section of the paper is trying to give examples of the current drive towards nationalist measures. The third section devotes space for a discussion of whether there are viable alternatives – called From TINA to TAMA (There are Many Alternatives). The fourth section argues that there are specific and uncovered strengths for mobilizing an alternative in the informal sector. Finally these discussions are put into the greater picture about the current debate about rights and democracy in East and Southeast Asia under the cacophony of crises
Positive or negative nationalism!
The unstoppable sweep of globalization has recently declined into simple assertions that viewing the world through an economic prism is inevitable. At the same time, the growing number of its failures and a rising wave of alternate views of the world have reached a critical stage. It seems that if those who are against globalization do not commit themselves to mainstream politics quickly, the vacuum they have created will be filled by a massive return of nationalism. Whether it is positive or negative nationalism remains to be seen. There are clear signs today of an aggressive rivalry between the two as both gain strength (Saul 2004).

 There is an observable swing back to nationalism and protectionist measures.. In the rich part of the world labor's share of GDP has fallen to historic lows, while profits are soaring.  Signs of a backlash abound. Stephen Roach has counted 27 pieces of anti-China legislation in Congress since early 2005. The German Marshall Fund found last year that more than half of Americans want to protect companies from foreign competition even if that slows growth. “In a hint of labor's possible resurgence, the House of Representatives has just voted to raise the federal minimum wage for the first time in a decade. Even Japan is alarmed about inequality, stagnant wages and jobs going to China. Europe has tied itself in knots trying to "manage" trade in Chinese textiles” (Economist Jan. 18th 2007). There has also been resistance in Congress to foreign takeovers and the change in visa requirements in the name of homeland security (Mcrae 2007), while investors no longer see the American market as the safe haven for investments. It is also of interest to note that many mainstream economists now are in favour of new regulation of the financial sector which was unthinkable just a year ago.
The signs on the wall show that if globalisation depends upon the democratic vote, if for instance workers, no longer think they gain from it, how long before democracies start to put up barriers to trade? “If all the riches go to the summit of society and that summit seems beyond everybody else's reach, are the wealth-creators under threat” (Economist Jan. 18th 2007)? Indeed the capitalist class never needed democracy which historically is well documented but it is also illustrated by the attractiveness of China and Vietnam to foreign capital – they are the real darlings of private capital and in this equation democracy and human rights are regarded as obstacles to high-speed economic profit.

The inherent contradiction between capitalism and democracy is also very visible in Europe where ngative nationalism in the form of new levels of xenophobia against first and foremost immigrants and refugees with a muslim background have left the European Left and social movements on the defensive. This is uncharted territory for European socialism. An offensive posture by socialists in defense of bourgeois rights in capitalist society confuses many issues. Under the conditions of real existing capitalism in Europe, socialists should be aware that ghosts from the past still haunt our societies. In disregard of European history, what seems to be lacking is that a substantial segment of the population is responsive to demagogy and that the most serious menace is to be found in the apparent change taking place in the political culture of society. European socialists ought to remember the warning by August Bebel that anti-Semitism is “the socialism of idiots.” In the present context, catering to a xenophobic discourse and nurturing Islamophobia serves the extreme right. It should be recalled that fascism is not only a structural phenomenon but requires an ideologically motivated mass movement. Seen in this light we can sense danger signals in most of Europe (Brun and Hersh forthcoming). 

From TINA to TAMA (There are Many Alternatives)
Perry Anderson has recently noted that the conviction that there is no alternative to neoliberal globalization runs deep in popular consciousness. “At the limit, as in France, office-holders who implement them are regularly rejected by voters, only to install new rulers, who with equal regularity continue as before. In this becalmed universe, the cry ‘Another World Is Possible’ risks sounding increasingly desperate. Setting aside normative abstractions (such as Roemer’s voucher socialism) or local anaesthetics (such as the Tobin tax or Jubilee movement), what strategic alternatives are currently on offer? The most plausible candidates are proposals like Robin Blackburn’s Global Pension or Philippe Schmitter’s Eurostipendium,9 that are designed to twist establishment headaches - pensions crises; cap - in an unexpectedly radical and far-reaching direction. But such ingenious schemes are few and far between. What others are discernible? In more stratospheric mode, Roberto Unger’s experimentalism offers a range of ways to increase subjective empowerment,10 whose explicit premise is the lack of any requirement - and diminishing probability - of objective crises in the system such as gave rise to radical or revolutionary movements in the past” (Anderson 2007. 27-28).

He concludes on a very pessimist note that the first years of the 21st century "have seen some spectacular demonstrations of popular will - the WSF in 2001–02, Venezuela in 2002–03, Bolivia in 2004, France in 2005 - and a patchwork of resistances elsewhere, but the overall drift of the period has been a further shift to the right, as a new Concert of Powers has increasingly solidified, the Arab street continues to be paralysed, and the imperatives of financial markets have more and more come to be taken for granted as conditions of social existence, from Europe to East Asia, Latin America to Southern Africa, Australia to remotest Micronesia ... neo-liberal doctrines are nearly everywhere the basic grammar of government. The conviction that there is no alternative to them runs deep in popular consciousness ... the cry ‘Another World Is Possible’ risks sounding increasingly desperate..." (Anderson 2007: 27).

In contrast and opposite to Anderson’s pessimism, finding a way of transgressing the capital–labour nexus, which is the fundament for the accumulation process, can be said to be the precondition for the most radical break with history. The current and emerging alternatives that are emerging can indeed be seen as examples of a break with the very holy grail of capitalism namely private property. New Left leaning governments seized the recent momentum of the democratic opening and won elections all over Latin America, except Mexico and Columbia, and in countries like Nepal the Maoist communist party has come to prominence in Parliament and forced the feudal King to abdicate the throne. A new situation has emerged in Nepal where redistributive economic policies along the lines of the Kerala Left will be enacted. The re-nationalization of oil and other natural resources in Venezuela, Equador, and Bolivia is a victory for the Left and a major rebellion against the dictatorship of finance and can be interpreted as a way to bring money back under the democratic control of public authorities and an end of the privatization of credit creation (Bienefeld 2007: 28). What is even more intriguing about these examples is the fact that the take-over of state power incidentially grew out of social movements - either through armed struggle or peaceful means and at the same time they all seem to operate with key strategic aspects from the global justice movements and taking factors into consideration such as nature, environment, land, rights and questioning the systemic backbone of capitalism – free trade and the link between labor and capital. What is at stake for anti-systemic forces is first and foremost to acknowledge that what is at issue is not the removal of market failure or governing the market. In the last instance, such an approach re-legitimizes capitalism as a socio-economic system based on class differentiation and competition, thereby representing more of an alternance than an alternative to real existing capitalism (Schmidt and Hersh 2006: 82).
Our future depends on a dramatic cultural and institutional transformation to reduce aggregate consumption and achieve an equitable distribution of economic power. It requires an epic institutional transformation to understand the imperatives of the 21st century: Reduce aggregate human consumption; redistribute financial power from rich to poor to achieve an equitable distribution of Earth’s life-sustaining wealth; Increase economic efficiency by reallocating material resources from harmful to beneficial uses; Invest in the regeneration of the living human, social, and natural capital that is the foundation of all real wealth; Accelerate social innovation, adaptation, and learning by nurturing cultural diversity and removing intellectual property rights impediments to the free and open flow of beneficial knowledge (Korten 2007). 
To achieve such as scenario the global justice movements' with some caveats might proceed into a Fifth International' (Bond 2004: 216-217): “The rise of the global justice movements as the world’s first-ever multi-issue political convergence was profoundly important, and South Africa has become a site of crucial, productive conflicts for these movements' developments. The time may well arise for a formalisation of the movement's character in explicitly political terms, such as within the traditions of international socialism – for which the first four 'internationals' provide a host of lessons, largely negative, about world-scale co-ordination.”

However, Bond asserts that nation-state priorities will be seen as overriding, because the balance of forces at the international scale simply does not offer progressive social movements any real scope for satisfying reforms, as efforts on debt, trade, environment, militarism and so many other examples continually prove. However, all optimistic outcomes depend upon an obvious prerequisite: the hard work of local, then national, then regional and finally global-scale organising.

Hence in sum, the approach of the South African social movements – thinking globally and acting locally first, while changing the balance of forces nationally and internationally, so that acting globally might one day generate something meaningful – is a wise route towards a final attack on global apartheid, and capitalism itself. “No matter the continual reversals, the opportunities to take up these challenges, and link them across countries and sectors of struggle, is now greater than at any time in memory” (Bond 2004: 219)

Another viable path, which is not excluding the important discussion about organization, is more concerned with strategy related to informalization and the trajectory of the new economy.

Informalization of labor – a new economy
In general capitalism has coped with the parallel informalized economy by denying its existence. New forms of informal economy and its importance has increased to such an extent that which economy is in fact the ‘normal’ one (Neef and Stanculescu 2002: 1). ILO estimates suggest that informal employment comprises about one-half to three-quarters of non-agricultural employment in developing countries - a staggering one billion workers are either unemployed or underemployed. Moreover, and perhaps even more significantly, these proportions appear to be rising even when economic growth is proceeding in developing countries, contrary to what a previous generation of researchers and policymakers had anticipated (Heinz and Pollin 2003: 1). The rise of this informal sector is a “direct result of liberalization,” and under such extreme conditions of competition, the neoliberal prescription of flexibility is simply catastrophic. “De Sotan slogans simply grease the skids to a Hobbesian hell. Those engaged in informal-sector competition under conditions of infinite labor supply usually stop short of a total war of all against all, conflict instead is usually transmuted into ethnoreligious or racial violence” (Davis 2006: 175 and 185).

The informal economy is removed from state regulation and formal institutions. It allows the cheap reproduction of labor and ensures the survival of populations struck by poverty. The absence of taxes and social contributions is paid for with high social risks. It is basically keyed to covering basic needs and everyday consumption, while accumulations requirements are seconday (Neef and Stanculescu 2002: 2). From the standpoint of neoliberal economic policy, informalization is not an unfortunate side-effect of other policy initiatives. 

It is rather a conscious policy outcome in itself. In other words, informalization and increased labor market flexibility are simply two ways of observing precisely the same phenomenon. The neoliberal policy approach can explain rising informalization through several mutually reinforcing channels. 1. Decline in public employment. The proportion of formally employed workers will necessarily fall each time governments cut their workforce. Neoliberal policies also encourage a decline in formal employment in the private sector; 2. Promotion of trade and foreign direct investment. The promotion of EOI and the ability to attract FDI is a fundamental element. Maintaining low labor costs is often the single dominant element for successfully promoting export orientation. The ultimate goal is to limit workers benefits of productivity improvements as increases in income, to reduce social and legal protections, and to weaken workers’ bargaining; 3. Macroeconomic policy strategy. Neoliberal prescriptions abandon labor market policies to achieve full employment. The deregulation of labor markets, i.e. increase in the flexibility of labor markets indicate that workers have to accept jobs at lower wages and under worse conditions. 4. Increased pressures for engaging in paid employment. When the supply of decent formal jobs declines and economic growth slows, this means that households need more people bringing home income to prevent a decline the household’s living standard. Women constitute a majority of workers in the informal economy. 5. The vicious cycle. These factors strengthen the bargaining position of business, enabling them to hire, or contract with, workers at lower wages, benefits and protections virtually across the board - that is, to increasingly transform what had been formal work environments into informal ones. The rise of informalization will feed upon itself as the bargaining power of workers weakens (Heinz and Pollin 2003: 6-7)

This is clearly the case in East and Southeast Asia where the result of IFIs push to increase flexibility of the labor markets has been increased informalization of employment. This is further exacerbated by serious increases in inequality. One of the implications is that the days are gone where the Northeast Asian NICs could claim credit for ‘equitable’ economic growth and egalitarianism. “Many countries in the region have witnessed increases in either/both types of informal employment, making it more difficult to find and even define formal employment. The normal or standard employment is becoming a misnomer” (Schmidt 2007: 39).
One of the main “results” after three decades neoliberal globalization have been that the prospects of achieving full employment have permanently receded. Unemployment has soured everywhere. It is also evident that it is not possible for all countries to pursue the Scandinavian strategy of flexicurity as it demands an embedded social compact between labor, employees and the state. The corporatist (without labor) developmental state in East Asia is also gone, perhaps with the exception of China where an undemocratic developmental state with “Chinese characteristics” has emerged. The nature of work has changed tremendously to a greater level of informalization and reliance on casual labor. Indeed we can also observe a trend towards Thirdworldization of labor markets in the North, especially in the United States (Schmidt 2006). In this connection it is crucial to understand that the current crisis is a transfer of wealth from the middle and lower classes to the ruling elite. Wealth transfers do not just happen, nor are they the products of incompetency. They are intentional and well-planned. Central to wealth transfer is corruption at the highest levels of the economic and political systems. The middle class is near extinction in the US not only because of a lack of financial information, but specifically because debt is "obscenely profitable" for lenders (Baker 2007). 
In another more strategic perspective informalization implies that capital has gone global while labor organization remains national. One reason is that trade unionism is no longer a struggle with capital but a trench war against the tax-payer probably because the public sector is easier terrain for trade union recruitment and the concomitant difficulties to organize workers in trade unions exposed to globalization. Also in Europe, South Africa, India and Brazil organized trade unionism has become weaker, divided, and reduced to confrontational politics, but with important exceptions. Work force growth and TNCs labor demolition strategies, “to remain internationally competitive” to use their pedestrian refurbished rationalisation, will augment joblessness with further soaring inequalities as their concomitant (Clairmont 1996: 346).

The issue is that there is a historical trend towards forms of production organisation in which capital no longer needs to pay for the reproduction of labor power. At the same time, participation in the global marketplace means that the domestic market is no longer needed to serve the self-expansion of capital. Jobless growth is what the present phase of capitalism is all about. “It is this process of globalization rather than any claimed imbalance in the national accounts between public and private sector growth (the fiscal deficit), nor any demographic imbalance (the greying population) that is the main reason for the perceived need to shed and restructure the welfare state which has become the dominant political project in all advanced countries since the 1980s” (Hoogvelt 113).  Coupled with the fact that there is a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of job flight and a competition of lowering standards, regulations and laws it is interesting to note that so far the responses from labor in the North are re-active and in most cases have relied on a defensive and protectionist strategy. 

The questions are what types of resistance are reliable and which are unsustainable in both a short-term and longer term perspective! Are the different types of anti-globalization in reality alter-globalization as some would accuse the global social justice movement for being an alnatertive expression of a different form of globalization?

Ellen Meiksin Wood’s criticises those anti-capitalists who focus on TNCs and international agencies. She points out that many of the arguments used against these organisations are not anti-capitalist, but anti-global. The real issue is that, globalisation is a consequence of capitalism, not a cause of exploitation. Instead Wood forcefully argues that nation states are still the most reliable guarantors of capital accumulation, and therefore states should remain the focus of opposition movements. She is correct when she argues that:  “While we can imagine capital continuing its daily operations with barely a hiccup if the WTO were destroyed, it is inconceivable that those operations would long survive the destruction of the local state.” And “...capitalism whether national or global, is driven by certain systemic imperatives of competition, profit maximization and accumulation, which inevitably require putting ‘exchange values’ above ‘ use values’ and profit above people.” The point is that, the capitalist state has always performed a very important function: “controlling the mobility of labor, while preserving capital’s freedom of movement” (Wood 2003: 134, 131, 133).

Globalisation can not create prosperity for all only the illusion of it. Globalization per se is not a new phenomenon but rather a rethoric invoked by governments in the North in order to justify their voluntary surrender to the financial markets.... “far from being — as we are constantly told--- the inevitable result of the growth of foreign trade, deindustrialization, growing inequality and the retrenchment of social policies are the result of domestic political decisions that reflect the tipping of the balance of class forces in favour of the owners of capital.” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2001; Hersh 2004 cf Schmidt 2006). This is why, there are increasing signs of popular and workers organised resistance against the impact of globalisation and “...a revolt against the idea that labor, rather than investors or management, should pay the cost of corporate globalization” (Pfaff 1997 cf Schmidt 2006).

The ideas of the free market satisfy the demands for a distortion of reality and to conceal the realities of exploitative relationships, in order to defuse the solidarity mechanisms of the oppressed. But it must also create the norms or identities which determine the role of the actors within the new accumulation system (Biel 2000: 170). In this way it is hiding new and old structures of dominance. In reality monopolies and speculative capital control the economy by undermining solidarity mechanisms. “An apparent culture of opportunity was created which, in exchange for a largely fractious promise of individual betterment, undermined solidarity movements in the third world and elsewhere” (Biel 2000: 171).

Informalization of the economy and the new social movements are a product of two factors: firstly, objective forces of capitalist development and secondly the attack on the organized left (Biel 289). Informalization can lead to an alternative social system. The informal sector is not a deux ex machine, but “a soulless wasteland,” yet also an economy of resistance that confers honour on the poor “where otherwise the logic of the market leads to total despair” (Davis 2006: 198).Although there are precarious work conditions etc. it also contains the seeds of an anti-exploitative struggle which can be dangerous to capitalism “for it often means that workers control their own productive activity in a co-operative way, and create local, self-sufficient economic systems.. They gain experience which would be highly valuable in the construction of an alternative system (Biel 290). Of course, the informalized populations support contradictory and numerous types of organizations, from faith-based communities, prophetic cults to ethnic militiasm street gangs, neoliberal NGOs, and revolutionary movements. As Davis mentions if there are no monolithic subjects or unilateral trends, there are nonetheless myriad acts of resistance. Indeed, the future of human solidarity depends upon the militant refusal of the urban poor, the slum dwellers and other people in the informal sectoro accept their terminal marginality within global capitalism  (Davis 2006: 202). 
 Consequently, the question that has to be resolved in order to surmount the dichotomy of welfare and workfare concerns the conflict between the expropriation of people’s means of subsistence and the continuous dependency of labour power as a market commodity. The commodification of work has been a determinant component of primitive accumulation which made and makes industrial capitalism possible. As noted by Karl Polanyi, this relationship puts workers at the mercy of the demands of capital. The human commodity has little control as to where, why and how it will be used or not used, a condition which has been exacerbated under neoliberal globalization, but is different in the informal secotr.
Although the ideological discourse of modern capitalism has sought to embed work as an individual psychological need, it overlooks the subsistence nexus which forces workers to sell their labour power. It is an irony of history that the ‘Right to Work’ has been celebrated as a great victory by the labour movement and socialist forces. But having imposed this right, workers landed in a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ situation whereby the essence of capitalist exploitation of labour was cemented politically and ideologically. Thus, the defensive struggle for the protection and betterment of the conditions of the working class could not be anything but a ‘guerrilla war’, without possible victory as long as the struggle did not raise the battle cry of the abolition of the wage system altogether. Voices within the socialist movement were aware of this impasse.

The promotion and struggle for participatory democracy, in the view of Albo, would open the way for opposition to neoliberal globalization: The opposite to globalization is democracy, not only in the crucial sense of civil liberties and the right to vote, but also in the no less crucial sense of the capacity to debate collectively as social equals about societal organization and production, and to develop self-management capacities in workplaces and communities (Albo, 1997, p. 28 cf Schmidt and Hersh 2006: 86) and in the informal sector.

Confronting the logic of the global market’s imperatives would demand besides the expansion of democracy a reduction of the scale of production. This would also be a way of alleviating the environmental damages created by unbridled productivism. Most important of the suggestions made by Albo to surmount the destructiveness of the global market and move the political agenda towards socialism beyond capitalism are his reflections on the ‘politics of time’. The argument that the conceptualization of labor time should be revised if not abandoned is close to the above argumentation concerning the abolition of wage labor and the fact that no such wage labor exists in the informal economy. In the optic of Albo, the notion of ‘work without end’, which has been the history of capitalism, the objective of ‘endless consumption’ under Fordism, and the Keynesian conviction that expanded output  should always have precedence over work-time reduction should all be superseded. The reduction of work-time would create the administrative framework for workplace democracy (Albo, 1997: 37 cf Schmidt and Hersh 1997: 86-86).
One should resist the easy temptation to elevate and idealise slum-dwellers into a new revolutionary class. It is nonetheless surprising how far they conform to the old Marxist definition of the proletarian revolutionary subject: they are ‘free’ in the double meaning of the word, even more than the classical proletariat (‘free’ from all substantial ties; dwelling in a free space, outside the regulation of the state); they are a large collective, forcibly thrown into a situation where they have to invent some mode of being-together, and simultaneously deprived of support for their traditional ways of life (Žižek 2004).

The slum-dwellers are the counter-class to the other newly emerging class, the so-called ‘symbolic class’ (managers, journalists and PR people, academics, artists etc) which is also uprooted and perceives itself as universal (a New York academic has more in common with a Slovene academic than with blacks in Harlem half a mile from his campus). Is this the new axis of class struggle, or is the ‘symbolic class’ inherently split, so that one can make a wager on the coalition between the slum-dwellers and the ‘progressive’ part of the symbolic class? The new forms of social awareness that emerge from slum collectives will be the germs of the future and the best hope for a properly ‘free world’ (Žižek 2004).

Rights and democracy in East and Southeast Asia under the cacophony of crises​[3]​
One of the main contradictions in the global neoliberal orthodoxy is how could the same ideology promise a planetary growth in democracy and yet a decline in the power of the nation state? Democracy exists only inside countries. Weaken the nation state and you weaken democracy. Why did an unprecedented increase in money supply translate into a dearth of money for public services? And why did this growth in new moneys enrich mainly those who already had money? Why did it lead to a growth in the rich-versus-poor dichotomy and a squeezing of the middle class? Why did many privatisations of public utilities neither improve services nor lower costs for consumers but instead guarantee revenues to the new owners while leading to a collapse in infrastructure investment (Saul 2004)?
Capitalism, which means quite literally rule by financial capital-by money and those who have it-in disregard of all non-financial values, has triumphed over democracy, markets, justice, life, and spirit. Human societies require strong, active, democratically accountable governments to set and enforce rules that assure costs are internalized, equity is maintained, and economic forces are channeled to the service of democracy, justice, life, and spirit. The current situation has exposed the myths that blind us to the irreconcilable conflict between capitalism and democracy and to the potential of community-centered, life-serving market alternatives based on principles of responsible citizenship, community, and equity (Korten 2007).
Existing democracies, and the complex social compromises on which they rest, confront a lingering death accompanied by growing social polarization and conflict, while new or ‘low intensity democracies’ are marked by the limited degree of progressive change they allow, rather than by their transformative capacity (Gills 2000: 5).  In this context there is a tendency in Asia, as elsewhere, to bracket civil society, idealize it as the moral conscience of society, and project its development as critical for democratic transition and consolidation. In reality it tends to be an ‘arena for power and struggle’ (Alagappa 2004: 6). However, there are multitude of NGOs catering to issues of survival like food security, rights and welfare while the continuing repression of people's rights to organise and oppose government policies in countries like Indonesia, Burma, and to some extent Malaysia and the Philippines are posing serious threat that might affect the gains achieved before (Guerrero 2001: 33 and 36).

In Southeast Asia, the situation was a bit different although some authoritarian regimes like Indonesia collapsed in conjunction with the aftermath of the financial crisis but on the other hand it seems that the dictatorship in Myanmar and one-party rule in Vietnam, and Laos are experiencing only gradual or virtually no sign of opening up access to other political forces’ potential influence on decision-making and the political system in general. The region is composed of a diverse mosaic of various types of regimes and might together with China and North Korea be considered one of the last strongholds of non-democratic political systems although with important variations between what some scholars refer to as soft authoritarianism (Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia) to full-fledged democracies, Westminster style or American style, in Thailand and the Philippines, respectively. The overall benchmark of the political evolution of the region in the past two or three decades show that the situation is fluid and could change tomorrow (Schmidt forthcoming)!

Even if societies are legally considered democratic there has not been complete freedom for opposition parties, freedom of speech, a separation of powers, or civil and political rights. societies where the emphasis is upon consensus and harmony, especially as an ideologically legitimising device with reference to economic growth, it has proved possible to deem opposition as subversive. Cultural values have been a tools to control dissent and the role of civil society has been curtailed to marginalisation. It has been widely by argued by some Asian leaders that free market development precedes democracy and civil rights, as indeed it did in the West (Schmidt forthcoming).

In the late 1990s and in the new millennium where there has been a virtual explosion in the expansion and diversification of civil society and also the academic community has become vigorous and engaged in terms of taking initiative and supporting the rise of new social movements and NGOs. “They are almost always based on educated and very often on university-connected cadres. These NGOs have generally aimed at establishing or supporting moral communities whose boundaries do not mirror those of the state apparatus, which is seen as a source of repression rather than the font of legitimacy. At one level, this is part of a transnational movement away from faith in the state, which is no longer seen as willing or able to safeguard basic social and economic concerns (as well of course, as a loss of faith in political parties as a source of remedy). At another level, the emergence of NGOs is a response to the failure of Southeast Asian states to dominate the vast changes over which they preside, and in particular to adjust to the rapid expansion and changing priorities of the middle classes. The current appreciation of the virtues of private over public ownership reflects the same attitude, however, different its social sympathies may be.” Especially after the financial crisis in Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia there are clear tendencies that social movements and NGOs have attempted to recreate an independent political space outside the reach of the state entities. The focus of the PP21 work is an example. It attempts to popularise self reliant economic projects like the Alternative Trade project between Japan and the Philippines. A similar initiative between Japan and Thailand started in 1999 as well. In Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, the big NGDOs are even supplanting the state structures in the delivery of services (Guerrero 2001: 28)

There is no doubt that civil society in Asia has emerged as a major force. It is now engaging in regional and national policy making and in some instances being recognised by multilateral institutions (Guerrero 2001: 24). Democratisation from below is spearheaded by communities who are asserting their own power and self management, preservation and development of the diversity of culture, life forms and knowledge systems, as well as pursuance of alternative development and human scale economies (or economies of communities). Such community initiatives are scattered in Thailand, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, India, and in the Philippines, for example, the popular education circle is now arguing for the redefinition of "people" towards "actually existing people", not limiting it to NGOs and other terms of objective categories. People then refer to those who are seeking for alternative paradigms, the real actors in the real world (Guerrero 2001: 24).

In connection to this it is important to stress that the old Left did have a relative strong intellectual base among students, and scholars and did receive moral and ideological support, and in many cases they even participated in the armed struggle, but there was a lack of pertinent and critical scholarship on a larger scale. The implication is that “the historical evidence contradicts the assumption that the development of civil society in capitalist societies is a progressive and incremental outcome of economic growth. Rather, civil society has ebbed and flowed in the region throughout this century.”

Although there are encouraging examples of victories won by CSOs especially in Thailand and the Philippines there is also considerable fragmentation of civil society. Encouraged by the global restructuring of production which fragments a labour force, formerly unified through comprehensive collective bargaining and class consciousness the new demands of flexible production and labour markets have decreased the strength of workers. This has implicitly meant that CSOs in a number of situations either act on behalf of labour or collaborate with non-unionised workers or more informally with the established trade unions.

Finally, there is a tendency towards CSOs either taking over state and public sector responsibilities but always with a significantly lower budget or they might even act against the interests of those who support increases in collective goods and social redistribution. In anyway they tend to deflect responsibility away from the state and as long as workers don’t have any political representation in accordance with their class interests this might not be a sustainable stragey in the long run. The very act of defining themselves as ‘non-governmental’ explicitly rejects any ambition for establishing an alternative hegemonic project, which would, by its nature, have to include states and governments as the means through which political and economic power is articulated in modern societies.
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